







  Intentional Structure and the Identity Theory of Knowledge in Bernard Lonergan:
                                  a Problem with Rational Self-Appropriation
                                                         I. The Problem                                                                                                  
     According to Lonergan, the intentional relation in which rational self-appropriation (RSA) occurs is of the same kind as that which produces first level knowledge, e.g., of mathematics or science. I argue that this cannot be the case, and I propose an amended theory in which the intending-subject-intended-object relation of first level cognition becomes in RSA a numerical identity of knower and known and of the epistemic and the ontological. The suggested modification is one with which I think Lonergan would be sympathetic. 
      It will be necessary to quote Lonergan at considerable length. To avoid confusion here and elsewhere in this paper it is important to note that Lonergan uses “objective” and its cognates in three distinct senses: (a) what is the case, the content of a true judgment; (b) a characterization of the relata which is other than the knowing subject in the intentional relation; (c) the result of formulating an insight as a universal concept. In the quotation which follows and in Parts I-III  “objective” and its cognates are used only in sense (b); in Part IV, they are also used in sense (c). (I have omitted references to a fourth level, moral commitment, with which this paper will not be concerned. I have made corresponding adjustments in brackets.)
It [RSA] is a matter of heightening one’s consciousness by objectifying it, 

and that is something that each one has to do in himself and for himself. 
In what does this objectification consist? It is a matter of applying the operations as intentional to the operations as conscious. Thus, if for brevity’s sake we denote the various operations on the [three] levels by the principle occurrence on that level, we may speak of the operations as experiencing, understanding, and judging. … These operations are both conscious and intentional. But what is conscious can be intended. To apply the operations as intentional to the operations as conscious is a [threefold] matter of (1) experiencing one’s experiencing, understanding, judging … (2) understanding the unity and relations of one’s experienced experiencing, understanding, judging … (3) affirming the reality of one’s experienced and understood experiencing, understanding, judging. … First, then, there are to be experienced one’s experiencing, understanding, judging … But this [three] fold experience is just conscious. We have it every time we experience, or understand, or judge. But our attention is apt to be focused on the object, while our conscious operating remains peripheral. We must then enlarge our interests, recall that one and the same operation not only intends an object but also reveals an intending subject,  discover in our experience the concrete truth of that general statement. That discovery, of course, is not 


a matter of looking, inspecting, gazing upon. It is an awareness, not of what is intended, but of the intending. It is finding in oneself the conscious occurrence, seeing, whenever an object is seen, the conscious occurrence, hearing, whenever and object is heard, and so forth.1 
      In a word, the same operations which produce first level cognition are applied to the “experiencing,” the “consciousness,” constitutive of first level cognition to produce RSA.
     What Lonergan means by “experience” as “just conscious” in this passage is crucial. In an intentional relation the intending subject is conscious both of its object and “of” itself. The second “of” has been placed in scare quotes to signal that the subject is not conscious “of” itself in the same way it is conscious of its intentional object. For Lonergan, the intentional subject is constituted by its consciousness; it is not made conscious by becoming an object of consciousness -- its own or anything else’s. It is not self-conscious, but itself-conscious; not conscious of itself, but a consciousness itself.  “[It] is the presence of [“of”] the subject to [“to”] himself that is distinct from, but concomitant with, the presence of the object to the subject.”2. Because this distinction between objects of consciousness and the consciousness proper to subjects is central to what follows, I shall use the expression “constitutive consciousness” (CC) to refer to the latter, instead of Lonergan’s “consciousness” or “experience,” both of which are sometimes used to refer to objects of consciousness. Note, also, that Lonergan’s description of this kind of cons-ciousness as “just conscious” may be misleading; for he holds that, although such cons- ciousness takes different forms at different stages of cognition, it, together with its object, is constitutive of cognition at all its stages.
     In what follows I will be extending this notion of constitutive consciousness without conflating it with an object of consciousness or with the first level knowledge of which it is a constitutive component. 
     Notice that Lonergan begins by saying that one “heightens” one’s CC by objectifying it, but concludes by saying that one “discovers” one’s CC and that this discovery is not an awareness of what is intended. This seems incoherent: “heightening” and “discovering” are very different things, and according to Lonergan it is only by intending something that one can objectify it. I discuss the first difficulty below (II. (2), (b) )). The second difficulty is easily resolved if the same rational CC which is the intentional subject of a first level intentional relation is also the intentional object of the second level intentional relation which is RSA. But if this is what Lonergan means, RSA would objectify a rational CC which has already occurred or is otherwise epistemically distinct from the rational CC currently operating in the act of RSA, so that the rationality which carries out and justifies the self-appropriation -- the very in vivo rationality we presumably wish to know -- would remain merely “experienced,” merely constitutively conscious. As such it would remain merely potential data for another intender-intended relation whose CC rationality would in turn elude complete cognitive closure. For Lonergan is clear that in first level cognition constitutive consciousness itself, whether “of” the subject’s sensing, or understanding, or 

judging, does not constitute knowledge of those operations or of the sorts of CC distinctive of them.  If it  does not do so in first level cognition, neither will it do so at the level of RSA, for the same  intentional structure is allegedly at work in both cases.
                                                         II. Some Variations
     I shall refer to the account given in the quoted passage (on its most plausible construal) as the “externalist” theory because the rational CC operating in RSA remains only “experienced.” Other theories of how an intentional relation might yield RSA are possible. It might be thought that the CC rationality currently operating in the act of RSA is distinct from any first level CC and is applied to itself. I shall refer to this as the “internalist” theory. Or it may be held that a rational CC operating in a first level cognition is the same one which objectifies itself in RSA. I shall call this the “hybrid” theory.3 
                                           II. (1) The Externalist Account of RSA
    I have shown that on the externalist theory the rational CC currently operating in the very act of RSA will be experienced but not known, in the proper sense of  “know.” Of course, one might, by iterating the intentional relation, generalize one’s past states of rational CC to other epistemic states of the same kind, including one’s present CC rationality. Lonergan seems to suggest this in the latter part of the quoted passage. But there are two problems with this theory. One is that it is difficult to see how a past state of consciousness could be “heightened” by a present conscious act. The other is that any such generalization would itself require reflection on one’s current rational CC in order to judge 

that the generalization applies specifically to it, and so would be blocked by the externalist difficulty it was meant to solve.    
      This problem does not arise in first level cognition. In order to know this or that one must be rationally CC, but need not know that he is, in the full sense of “know” as that term is used by Lonergan; that is, one’s CC rationality need not be the object of an intentional relation. The problem arises only with knowing knowing, with rational self-appropriation.
                                            II. (2) The Internalist Account of RSA
      On this view, RSA will objectify the CC rationality then operating as the intentional subject in the very act of rational self-appropriation; so there will be no difficulty with a residual, merely “experienced” rationality. But there are other problems.      
     (a) There is a difficulty with epistemic modalities. If RSA objectifies itself by applying to itself the same intentional acts which occur in first level cognition, then it would seem that one and the same rational subject would be conscious of one and the same thing, that is, that rationality itself, as both a CC subject and as an intentional object (Lonergan actually says this.4) To use a linguistic analogy, the same rationality would be both used and mentioned. But if this is the case, how does this complex consciousness (or worse, complex of consciousnesses) achieve RSA? Are we, after all, to think of the CC rational subject as  “gazing” at itself in a conceptual or propositional mirror?  But if so,  either the 


subject must already have moved from CC rationality as merely “experienced” to RSA, in which cases objectification is not needed, or the subject has not yet made that transition, in which case the objectification will merely reflect -- “discover” -- that state of affairs. Elsewhere, Lonergan argues persuasively that if the subject is not already conscious prior to reflecting on itself, that reflection would reveal only the subject’s lack of consciousness. Similarly, he insists that the intentional relation only reveals the object known, that it does not alter it.5 The same reasoning seems applicable to the internalist version of RSA. (It also applies to the externalist version if we are to get more from first level CC rationality than is already present in the first level intentional relation.)
    (b) Perhaps we should say that although RSA cannot occur unless a CC rationality “objectifies” itself, this objectification neither duplicates the same knowledge in different modalities nor discovers anything (Lonergan’s language notwithstanding) in one’s CC rationality. Instead, objectification “heightens” one’s rational CC, and this intensified CC rationality just is rational self-appropriation. But “heightening” would seem to be a differ-ent thing from “discovery” or “insight,” the terms Lonergan invariably uses to describe first level cognition. And, quite apart form this difficulty, how could “heightening” promote rational CC to knowledge of one’s rationality, i.e., to RSA, rather than merely producing a more “intense” experience “of” one’s rationality? If it is a matter of self-objectification somehow bootstrapping (“mediating”) itself into RSA, how is the trick done? For object-ification to bring about RSA by communicating to the subject an already existing and 
appropriated RSA would be viciously circular. Nor could the rational CC currently operating in RSA bring about that RSA either directly or indirectly, for it is the very thing 
one is trying to promote RSA. One is at a loss to see what objectification could contribute to RSA or, indeed, what such “objectification” could mean in this  case.   
     (c) It would still be the case that the source of illumination or power of “heightening” lies in the subject’s constitutive consciousness. If, in objectifying itself, one’s rational CC (somehow) generates a new rational CC, we will be faced with the vicious regress of the externalist version of RSA. On the other hand, if the in vivo rational CC reflects on itself, will the subject’s CC rationality be “heightened,” and thus made properly known, by virtue of being objectified, or will the objectification become capable of  “heightening” by virtue of the subject’s CC rationality?
      Thus on the externalist theory one’s currently operating rationality escapes appropriat- ion, and on the internalist theory it is produced rather like the rabbit out of the magician’s hat.6
      Again, these puzzles do not arise in first level cognition. One is aware of the other as object, but constitutively conscious “of” himself as subject because, as I will suggest below, the differing epistemic modalities correspond to different entities. The ontological and the epistemic remain distinct. 
                                               II. (3) The Hybrid Theory of RSA
     This theory would allow the CC rationality currently operating in RSA to be the object of the intentional  relation in which it is also  the  cognitional subject, and  thus to be  fully 

known; but it identifies the rational CC operating in RSA with a rational CC also operating at the first level. Thus one and the same cognitional state would be merely CC, merely “experienced,” in relation to its first level object, and also fully known in relation to its own self-objectification in RSA. Also, there would be two simultaneous intentional objects, the one being known in the first level intentional relation and the one being known in RSA. This is awkward, to say the least. It might be suggested that the first level CC rationality ceases to be merely experienced when it objectifies itself and that the first level intentional relation is lost entirely. This suggestions amounts to a version of internalism and, although I drop objectification in RSA entirely, is not unlike the proposal I make below (III.1).
                                                         III. A Suggestion
     I am reasonably confident that there are problems of roughly the sort described in  reconciling RSA with any of the accounts of intentionality we have been discussing. I cannot feel as confident about a solution. The line I will propose is very speculative and raises problems of its own which I will not be able to explore in this paper.
    There is a fundamental point to be made first. In a constitutively conscious item, to be is 
to be conscious, just as with anything to be is to be the sort of thing that item essentially is. Thus, insofar as it is, it is conscious (a consciousness) and nothing about itself is hidden from it: that is what is meant by consciousness as  “self-presence.” Put thus starkly the claim will be widely (and perhaps wildly) resisted, but I do not see how to avoid it. It fol- 

lows that prior to RSA what is to be known is not, as in first level knowledge, ontologically complete but epistemically opaque; that is, it is not a datum the immanent intelligibility of which is already fully there to be discovered. In RSA it is just the other way around. Rational CC is already conscious “of” all that it then is. In requiring that rational CC learn something further or more “intensely” “about” itself, RSA requires that it become something more, that it acquire an immanent intelligibility it does not yet have (or does not yet have explicitly at the same level of actualization as in first-level data). Again, this is very a Lonerganian notion, but Lonergan does not seem to have noticed its relevance to his theory of RSA. Below I use the identity of the epistemic with the ontological in rational consciousness as the core of my proposal. But if one does not see the plausibility of this view of consciousness, neither will he see the fundamental problem with Lonergan’s account of RSA nor, obviously, the point of my alternative suggestion.
Constitutive consciousness would seem to be best understood, not by multiplying interior or exterior relations, but by eliminating relations which divide an item from itself and, a fortiori, from the other. This hyper-unity of consciousness is implied by the identity theory of knowledge upon which Lonergan insists.7 RSA would seem to be the paradigm case of the identity of the knower and known.8 Can its unity survive bifurcation into a really distinct intentional subject and intentional object?	                                                                             ,    On this view, RSA cannot consist of discovering or uncovering some fact about one’s rational  constitutive  consciousness. Nor, as  we saw, could  being made t he object of  an 

intentional relation somehow summon into actual existence a hidden potentiality of CC rat-ion-ality: RSA is a fundamental development. In first level cognition the unfolding of the subject’s cognitional operations is also ultimately spontaneous and, hence, mysterious; but at least these operations are partly stimulated by objects which, although they come to the subject as data, are in themselves already fully formed ontologically.
     Let us refocus the problem with an example. As I type this sentence I certainly seem to myself to be reflecting rationally, not only on the correctness or incorrectness of the above analysis, but also and more interestingly, on my rationality in doing so. Perhaps I shift in a barely perceptible moment from one level of reflection to the other; but at the instant of higher level reflection the CC in which I reflect rationally seems to be the present, constitutively conscious measure and guide by which I judge the correctness of my reflections on it. By “guide” I do not mean data or any objectified experience or objectified intelligibility. By “measure” I mean the standard which ultimately constitutes the success or failure of the guiding (The hand guides the weapon, but the puncture in the target measures the success of the guidance). The puzzle is that in RSA the guide and the measure are identical and appear to be evoked by the reflective process they guide and measure.
                                                  III. (1) Intentionality Modified
    Suppose that the theory of intentionality is thought of as requiring that every intending subject intends something, but not that t must intend an object or intend something in any  

way distinct from itself. This would amount to saying that in RSA the intending-subject-intended-object relation is indeed “collapsed” or “lost,” (as Michael McCarthy puts it9) into 
a more fundamental epistemic state. If this suggestion can be made to work, there would seem to be no reason why an intentional subject could not know itself (not merely be constitutively conscious of itself as knowing this or that) in vivo, without any ontological or epistemic distinction between knower and known and, as we shall see, without any ontological bootstrapping. In addition, less obscure senses for “intending,” “attending,”  “objectifying” will be become available.
    Consider our problem about epistemic modalities in the internalist version. In first level knowing both the CC subject and her operations, on the one hand, and the object intended, on the other, are in the conscious field, though they are conscious in different modalities (“dimensions”) At this level, then, constitutive consciousness (whether experiential, intelligent, or rational) might be said to be conscious in itself or by means of itself but not of itself  (it is only conscious “of” itself), while that of which it is conscious is conscious neither in, nor of, nor by itself, but in or by CC -- epistemically (but not ontologically) grounded or, as it were, enveloped in the subject’s CC. I think this is implied by Lonergan’s insistence that one must be present to herself for anything else to be present to her.             			  The “inner light” simile sometimes used by Lonergan is an appropriate and fruitful image for the operation of rational intelligence, and I shall use it instead of some more cumbersome expression  such as  “wonder and  its implementing  operations.”10 So  the  illumination which 

envelopes the first level object of consciousness, although it penetrates its object through and through in justified judgment, remains exterior to it insofar as it finds its source elsewhere. Thus in the case of first level objects of consciousness (excepting other persons as conscious) illumination would be doubly extrinsic to them: by modality as well as by the fact that, when known as they really are, such items will be known to be without intrinsic illumination. They will be only “darkly” present to themselves and to other items which also are only “darkly” present to themselves – mutually present through, for example, the operation of the same natural laws. (If I know that items other than myself have minds, I know it by my CC inquiring, not by theirs; their inquiring would be known objectively by me to be CC in them, presumably by analogy with myself.) 
    Thus, in the case of first level knowing the act of attending has two principles or “poles,” one of which is its own CC, which creates the epistemic field, and the other of which is the object intended/attended to, which is the epistemic burden in the field. The result is said to be two different epistemic items, a knower and a known, and two distinct epistemic modalities, constitutive consciousness and its object or content.
     Unfortunately, Lonergan is not clear about what “objectifying,” “intending,” “attending” are. How are these epistemic acts related to each other, and how exactly does each function in cognition? With regard to first level knowledge, talk of cognitional objects seems clear enough. But what can “intentional object” mean in RSA if there is no distinction whatever between knower and known?  I suggest that  the distinction  between epistemic  modalities 

which led to some of our difficulties above be thought of as arising solely from ontological difference and not as a distinction intrinsic to cognition itself, as talk of different epistemic “dimensions” or “modalities” might suggest. If such intentional objectivity arises only in relation to what is in some way ontologically other that the knowing subject, it would seem that “self-attending,” “self-intending” at the point where rational self-appropriation is attained is modally as well as ontologically unitary, and so not merely an iteration of the first level intentional structure as usually understood. (Below I suggest that the ontological self-other distinction parallels the interiority-exteriority distinction between the origin of illumination and object of illumination; but for now things are sufficiently involved.)
     On the proposed modification, intending in its various kinds would be identified with consciousness in its various kinds, but attending would be a function of consciousness together with its object (“quasi-object” in the case of generalized RSA, as we shall see) or, perhaps more simply, ‘attending’ may be taken as an alternate term for intending an object other than one’s own consciousness. In what follows I shall be using ‘intending’ and ‘attending’ in these senses. Intending at the level of justified judgment just is knowing; attending to an object is only a special case of intending.
      Above (II.3) I said that a version of the hybrid theory amounted to internalism and was not unlike the theory I propose. This can now be clarified. Whether RSA involves a new CC consciousness or is a further development of one already operating at the first level, obviously, some rational consciousness must be present; and since the process whereby that consciousness attains RSA is quite different from the way it knows other items, its emergence as a further development of a first level, merely “experienced,” consciousness seems less objectionable. If the cognitional subject can “experience” herself, that is, intend  herself in the sense of ‘intend’ given above, while attending to an object, then presumably she can intend herself more fully while attending to an object. This version of the hybrid theory seems preferable to one in which RSA occurs de novo and  so raises problems of continuity between the subject’s conscious ego states; but it is essential not to lose sight of how this further development differs from first level knowledge. I take us this matter again below (IV.1)
                               III.2. Identity of the Epistemic and Ontological in RSA
   The suggestion is that in RSA the CC subject,  its intending, and the object of that intending would be the same numerically identical epistemic-ontological item. Recall that, although a certain state of CC is concomitant to intending (attending to) an object (at whatever intentional level the inquiry may be operating), the intending (attending) itself is present “to” itself by its CC. (Judging rationally does not consist in viewing an objective concept of rationality and then using that model of rationality to judge rationally.) The object, however, is present by the CC intending (attending) but is not itself that CC intending (attending). In the case of intending one’s rational CC, both originate in, and remain interior to, the intender’s CC. They are ontologically constituted by that consciousness. To (somehow) interpose a representation -- or any sort of objectification -- would be to alienate rational CC from itself without adding anything to what it is or what it 

is known to be, as I have argued above.
    On this view, one’s rationality would know itself by becoming more fully the epistemtemic-ontological item it potentially is; and so in RSA there would be neither ontological nor epistemic duality. The difference in first level epistemic modalities would be construed as arising from, and as constituted by, the epistemic relation to the ontological other. RSA would be distinguished from the ordinary rational CC at work in knowing this or that by virtue of its more complete development and centeredness (an “attention to” itself in which the attentional vector “collapses” into pure intention – into an identity of the knower and known). This implies that a unity of non-reflexive, non-objectified consciousness is essential to rational CC, but that its being a datum for further cognition, its being merely an “experience” of rationality short of complete knowledge, is not. In RSA, the subject’s own proper consciousness as a subject achieves, without objectification, 
a level of CC which constitutes full knowledge of itself. This is the extended notion of CC promised earlier.
      The scholastic distinction between formative and apprehensive abstraction will help in understanding what is being suggested. In apprehensive abstraction intelligence is said to catch on to the central or conjugate form as (while) it is ontologically instantiated by the data itself, in situ, as it were. Formative abstraction is a further epistemic act which detaches the form, making it for the  moment a solely epistemic item and thereby making its extension as universal explicit.11 What I am proposing is that in RSA there would be apprehensive abstraction (insight), as it were, without any otherness dividing the knower and known. There would be no ontological division, because the knower and known would be identical; and there would be no distinction in epistemic modalities, both because there would no ontological other and because the apprehensive abstraction which consummates inquiry would itself be genuine knowledge and would not require (though it may perhaps be extended by) formative generalization (see IV. (5) below). As first level apprehensive abstraction knows the other without universalizing, so RSA would capture what is really the case about itself by fully becoming itself, without formative abstraction. But whereas one’s knowledge of the other is not constitutive of the other, in RSA one knows one’s knowing by becoming that knowing.      
     Of course, this analogy fails insofar as it suggests that in RSA there is insight into something which already exists but is not yet known. I have argued that this is inconsistent with the self-presence which is constitutive of a conscious entity. On the present suggestion, the correct analogue in RSA of first-level apprehensive abstraction is the further coming-to-be of one’s rationality itself (one’s rational self), an ontological coming-to-be which is identical with an epistemic coming-to-know. It seems to me that this is an advance over an account in terms of “objectification” which fails to make clear just what “objectification” is or how it confers the status of proper knowledge on what is otherwise merely constitutively conscious. The present proposal is a direct application of the 
Lonerganian doctrines that knowledge is by identity and that “everything that is known is known insofar as it is in act.”12 RSA would not consist in a duplication of a first level intentional relation in which its self-presence is an objectified element. On the contrary,  in RSA one would grasp this first level intentional structure in its relation to RSA’s more unified and fully developed cognitional state.
      Identity of the epistemic and the ontological in RSA disposes of our problems with both the externalist and internalist theories of RSA and makes the complexities of the objectionable version of the hybrid theory unnecessary. For by “collapsing” the intentional relation found in cognition of the other it disposes of the need for a new CC and, hence, of the vicious regress, and eliminates all intentional subject-object duality. 
        It is not that intending-attending to one’s rationality summons into existence a mature rational self-knowledge that was not already there. “Self-attending,” “self-intending,” “self-reflective inquiry,”  “self-heightening” would be neither an efficient nor an epistemic cause 
of RSA. Instead, I suggest (without any exhilarating sense of  conviction,  for reasons that appear in IV. (4)) that what seems like first level attending to one’s rationality is an advanced maturation of that rationality – a tension between what it is and what it is coming to be, rather than a polarity between the intentional subject and an intentional object which is already ontologically formed and radically other.  
      An implication of this maturational account of RSA is that one’s basic intellectual development, as well as the progress from experience to knowledge in particular cognitions, is --for all its very real immanence -- ultimately  spontaneous. The foundation of cognition is the disposition to inquire, and that disposition is ultimately given. We cannot produce it from scratch any more than we can give ourselves any other basic motive. (What would be our motive for doing so?). The imperatives “be attentive, be intelligent, be reasonable” can move us only to the extent we have a prior interest in knowing. 
     Of course, it appears otherwise, and, at a certain level, it is otherwise. Discussion of intellectual  “self-mediation” would raise metaphysical puzzles which I, certainly, do not know how to resolve. But the fact remains, that, ultimately, one “finds” one’s self becoming intellectually curious. Perhaps because the ingress of wonder is at the inner limit of what is most intimately one’s self, it strikes one as both transcending one’s intellectual self and as what one’s intellectual self most fundamentally is, as constitutive of one’s intellectual autonomy. As Lonergan puts it, one’s rationality is one’s self in a very intimate way.
                            III. 3. Extrinsic and Intrinsic Sources of Illumination
    I have suggested that intentional objectification properly so called occurs only in the relation of the CC subject to something which is in some way other than the subject and which therefore participates extrinsically in the CC subject’s intrinsically illumined consciousness. I now suggest that the subject-object, intender-intended, presence-presenced distinction just is this distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic illumination, which in turn is equivalent to the distinction between  the self and  the other  in  ordinary cognition.13,14
    To summarize Part III, in first level cognition intentional objectivity arises both from the ontological otherness of the object and, equivalently, from exteriority of illumination. In RSA’s coming-to-be, the illumination is entirely interior at each stage, but there is a quasi-

objectification in the ontological-epistemic relation between rational CC as it is and as it is coming to be. In achieved RSA, even this quasi-objectification is “collapsed” into a strict epistemic-ontological identity. (As we shall see in Part IV, objectification again enters the 
picture if and when the “apprehensive insight” of RSA is generalized to other cases of the same type in formative abstraction.) 
                                     IV. Where Does This Leave Critical Realism?
     Do these suggestions undermine anything essential to critical realism? I very much hope not.  
                 IV. 1. “Empty” Consciousness and Consciousness “in Two Dimensions 
      On  the proposed theory, the consciousness proper to CC in both its limited form and in RSA is eptistemically and ontologically unitary and thus without distinction of subject and object. (In the less mature form, and perhaps in its fully mature form, CC will also have an intentional object which is extrinsic to it.) RSA has no objectified content; but neither would it consist of “looking into” one’s rational consciousness in order to “see” the foundational structure of cognition, as one might look into an electric light to see the filament. Everything about everything about the light (or as nearly so as is possible for finite entities) is illumination, nothing “in” it is illuminated. The suggestion that the modal (as opposed to ontological) otherness of the object arises by virtue of its being externally illuminated is at least consistent with this view.                                                                           


    So. insofar as it is without any objectified content, such consciousness is “empty.” This seems relevant to the capacity of CC to be present “to” its self without thereby occluding consciousness of its object. But apart from characterizing this cognitional fact as “consciousnesses, as it were, in different dimensions,” Lonergan gives us little help in understanding it. The present theory does not help much either, but perhaps it offers a clue. By objectifying the known, the undivided epistemic-ontological subject preserves onto-logical difference. This clue as to why there is “consciousness in another dimension” may also provide a clue to what those dimensions are.15\
                                             IV. (2). Knowledge by Identity
    Obviously, on the present suggestion RSA is knowledge by identity of knower and known. Knowledge of the other is by epistemic identity, in the knowing subject’s light, of the knowing subject with what is ontologically diverse from it, and in this sense can be said to involve correspondence. How the other can share the knowing subject’s light, that is, be captured by inquiry within the invariant structure and operations of first level cognition without sharing the being which is identical with that light, remains profoundly puzzling; but it is a puzzle which every epistemology must ultimately face and which none has succeeded in solving. It is the most fundamental epistemological problem.
                                              IV. 3. The Notion of Being
     The critical realist approach to being is epistemic: being is defined as the object of the disinterested, unrestricted desire to know. Have I abandoned this approach by giving an ontological account of RSA in terms of becoming? I think not. For rational consciousness to wax and wane is for that self-knowledge and the being which is that self-knowledge to wax and wane; for, to repeat, in this case the ontological is the epistemic. Perhaps the becoming more or less rational of an item whose being is to be rational may be taken  as  the paradigm case of becoming anything – it is certainly the most intimately accessible. 
      Nevertheless, it is well to restrict ourselves as far as possible to the cognitional subject and the primitive data available to her. Though I cannot attempt it here, I think the theory I am proposing can be stated in terms of epistemic states and data alone, where the data itself 
is neutral with regard to the existence or non-existence of an “external world” and where metaphysical notions arise, as for Lonergan, from cognitional analysis.16 
                                         IV. 4. The Transcendental Argument
     Does this account of RSA compromise the transcendental (unrevisability) argument? I hope not, since I am convinced that the transcendental argument is sound. But the foregoing suggestions certainly seem to complicate it. I seem to myself to want the proposed hypothesis about RSA to appeal to experience, understanding, and judgment, and I seem to be going about it by applying to my own knowing the same process which I apply to first level knowledge. But if the resulting theory is correct, RSA declares itself an exception to the universality and necessity of these operations -- just as it reveals itself as an exception to the cognitional-subject-cognitional-object structure of intentionality. For it argues that prior to the achievement of RSA the fully mature rationality to be appropriated is not ontologically formed, and so there is nothing to experience; hence, also, there is no hidden intelligibility to understand, and no rationality adequate to judge its correctness if the understanding did exist, for the only adequate judge would be that RSA itself.
       It is both intriguing and vexing that the theory of RSA proposed in this paper seems 
itself to have been developed within an intentional structure. Earlier I spoke of the intentional structure within which knowledge of the other occurs as “polarizing” a more unitary cognition. To elaborate this figure, the puzzle is implicit in the attempt to illuminate the fully developed light externally – as other -- by directing onto it its own diffracted spectrum, under the rather hampering circumstance that the fully developed light does not yet exist. Above I made a gesture toward a solution by suggesting that what in RSA appears to be the same set of operations which occur in first level knowing is really a tension arising from the subject’s fuller actualization. Perhaps the account of first level knowledge itself can be reworked in terms of the present theory without sacrifice of the unrevisability argument or anything else essential to critical realism. 
        This difficulty might also be meet with the rather arch retort that the present proposal is not offered as an instance of RSA, but as a preliminary attempt to work out how RSA would have to occur if it did occur. Is there any reason why this could not be done prior to 
its occurrence in anyone, in the same way that Lonergan claims to sketch the primary intelligible without claiming to have had any experience of it, or why it might not afford as good an occasion for RSA as any other attempt to understand?                               
IV. 5. Does RSA Require Formative Abstraction? Lonergan’s account in Verbum of the relation of formative to apprehensive abstraction (insight) is somewhat unsatisfactory. Formative abstraction is said to function in a number of ways. It detaches the content of the apprehensive insight from its constraints in the data 
and thus universalizes it; it identifies the precise elements of the data which gave rise to the insight;  and it provides a means of  “confronting”  the content of the insight so that it can be verified at its source.17 
     But such a confrontation of the apprehensive insight and comparison of it with the data would be pointless. For if the apprehensive insight is not already intelligible, formative abstraction will not make it so, and because any such comparison with the data would require another apprehensive insight. Requiring formative abstraction in order to identify the features of the data which gave rise to the insight would be equally pointless; for if one was not sufficiently consciousness of what features of the data gave rise to the insight when one had it, conceptualizing the content of the insight later will not make her so. 
     We are left with a conceptualization which captures the intelligibility of the item as a universal. In the spirit of foregoing suggestions, I am inclined to think that the need for further conceptualization arises from the need to relate the rationally appropriated subject to other such (at least possible) subjects. Moreover, to grasp the commensurable of one’s intelligence with being is partly to grasp its adequacy to what has been achieved and partly to grasp its adequacy as a normative propensity for further, potentially unlimited achie-vement. This tendency toward the “known unknown” is, in a certain sense, the presence  of the other in RSA -- presence, as it were, by consciousness of its absence. If so, formative abstraction would not be needed in order to appropriate the scope of one’s intelligence.
                                          V. Getting RSA the Right Way Around
       In trying to understand RSA we are to some extent misled by the fact that what is first in the order of intelligibility is last in the order of cognitional (and ontological) development. Our rationality appropriates itself at the consummation of a process which 
begins as an explicit finding of the other and is only implicitly and incipiently the “finding” of itself. But there would not be, as on the externalist version, a shift  to a new intentional  relation  with  the implied shift to a new CC state of attending other than the one we hoped to attend to. So knowledge of our present rationality would not escape us by becoming the merely  “empirical” residue of an attempted RSA. Nor would there be any question of uncovering some unconscious feature of our consciousness;  nor would there be a double modality of consciousness. 
     The movement from a less mature and centered CC to a more mature and centered CC would be no more (and no less) mysterious than the maturation of any organism. But since 
what is coming more fully into existence is a conscious, rational intelligence, it becomes at the same time more fully an instance of self-presence (an instance of presence itself) -- a consciousness undivided from itself by the presence of the other, by objectification, or by 
ontological potentiality in relation to itself. 
                                                              Summary
     It would be much tidier if the intentional structure of first level cognition could be  applied “as is” to rational self-appropriation, but the attempt to do so results in serious problems. I have suggested that RSA be viewed as a maturation of one’s rationality in which the complex intentional structure of first level knowledge is collapsed into an epistemic-ontological identity. Thus the epistemic distinction between intentional object 
and intentional subject would not be a feature of knowledge per se but only of knowledge of what is in some sense other than the knower.        
    The most serious difficulties with this proposal are that it seems to unsettle the transcendental (unrevisability) argument and raises issues of how RSA comes into being and how the other can share in the rational subject’s epistemic self-presence without also sharing in the being which is that self-presence. I make some suggestions about how the first difficulty might be dealt with, but I have nothing to offer in this paper concerning the last two. 
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